Introduction
Wild fish from the oceans are a vitally important, internationally shared and traded food resource. Officially reported landings from marine fisheries worldwide currently amount to nearly 80 million tonnes per year, and the global marine fishing fleet is thought to include approximately 4.6 million vessels.
1 Combined with aquaculture and inland fisheries, it has been estimated that marine fisheries assure the livelihoods of 12 % of the world's population. 2 It is, however, troubling that this global industry and the health of the marine ecosystems which support it are currently under threat. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities maintain profitability or reduce exposure to risk and accidental losses. Insurance cover is moreover required of larger fishing vessels under the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 (Bunkers Convention). 24 It can, therefore, be suggested that restricting access to liability insurance, which is often provided by Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs, for vessels suspected of involvement in IUU fishing, might well help to combat IUU fishing. This article analyzes two main issues: i) is there empirical evidence to suggest that vessels suspected of involvement in IUU fishing encounter little difficulty in obtaining liability insurance (which effectively enables them to freely access ports around the world)? ii)if so, what practical and legal steps can be taken to reduce the prospect of such vessels obtaining liability insurance, in particular if there are indications that they are regularly involved in IUU fishing?
To this end, in the following part the empirical study carried out, that demonstrates that those involved in IUU fishing have no serious difficulty in obtaining liability cover, will be presented.
In Section 3, deficiencies in current underwriting practices that allow IUU vessels to obtain liability cover with ease will be discussed and suggestions as to how the current system can be improved will be made. In Section 4, it will be argued that to ensure a change in the current http://www.imo.org/en/About/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-on-civil-liability-forbunker-oil-pollution-damage-(bunker).aspx. The Bunkers Convention requires the registered owner of ships over 1000 gross tonnage to obtain compulsory insurance against oil pollution damage from bunker oil or have in place financial security (Art. 7). In order to prove that the compulsory insurance or financial security is in place, the vessel carrying the flag of a Contracting State should carry on board a Bunker Convention Certificate. Similarly, a vessel, although she does not carry the flag of a Contracting State, would be required to present a Bunker Convention
Certificate in order to enter into a port in a Contracting State. This means that fishing vessels over 1000 gross tonnes will need to have such a certificate in place if they are flying the flag of a Contracting State or attempting to enter into a port in a Contracting State. As of June 2017, the Convention has 84 Parties.
practices of liability insurers, the best solution will be reforming European Union or domestic legislation and putting them under a clear positive obligation to decline cover to those involved in IUU fishing.
Empirical Study
An empirical study conducted during 2014 and 2015 confirms that vessels suspected of having involvement with IUU fishing had no serious difficulty in finding liability insurance cover. 25 For the purposes of the study, 94 fishing vessels of 1,000 gross tonnes or higher, officially listed or suspected to be involved in IUU fishing, were identified. They were identified by screening The results of the study are shown in Table 1 . The study reveals that at least 47.9% of fishing vessels (1,000 gross tonnes or more) known for involvement in IUU fishing had secured liability insurance. These vessels were associated with a total of 14 liability insurers. The study also shows that an appreciable number of the vessels that had purple notices issued in respect of them by INTERPOL, requesting international cooperation in obtaining information that could lead to an arrest, were associated with one particular insurer.
These results confirm the original hypothesis that IUU fishing is not yet an issue that is being adequately addressed by insurers, and thus that the insurance sector inadvertently facilitates IUU fishing. The rest of this article discusses underwriting and legal measures that can be taken to reduce the availability of liability insurance for vessels suspected to be involved in IUU fishing.
Underwriting Practices
There are two main providers of liability insurance for large fishing and support vessels (e.g. reefers). Such vessels might be entered in a P&I Club 26 or insured in the commercial market, although the cover provided by commercial insurers is likely to be more restricted and possibly costlier for the assured. 27 All P&I clubs based in the United Kingdom (UK) provide that their 26 P&I clubs are mutual insurance organizations which traditionally provide cover for a wide range of third party liabilities arising from the operation and use of the entered vessels, such as collisions, pollution, loss of life, personal injury and illness, wreck removal and also fines. The cover generally includes civil penalties, exemplary damages and other impositions similar in nature to fines. Although the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio (a tainted source gives rise to no cause of action) would certainly prevent the benefit of a policy of life insurance to be accrued to the murderer of the assured, the maxim must be applied with caution when it comes to liability insurance. If the assured is not allowed to recover for fines imposed at all, this would to a large extent defeat the purpose of such insurance. Furthermore, recovery for fines in this context would not be against public policy as stressed by Friedman J in Shooter v. Incorporated General Insurances Ltd (The Morning Star) 1984 4 SA 269, at 282-4, especially if the assured itself is not at fault. In practice, cover for fines is generally provided only where the owner is not personally at fault, and often only as a matter of discretion.
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Central to the operation of P&I Clubs is the concept of mutuality, i.e. that their members, usually shipowners, insure each other, being at the same time assured and insurer. As a result, and in contrast to commercial insurers, the Clubs are non-profit organizations that prioritize the insurance needs of their members. This is reflected in the omnibus rule that appears in the Rule Book of most P&I Clubs, namely, that the Directors of the Clubs have discretion to settle claims that fall outside the cover provided by the Club provided that they are P&I in nature. No such discretion is normally exercised by commercial insurers. It should also be borne in mind that P&I Clubs, rules are subject to English law (including 8 of the 13 Clubs that are part of the IG of P&I Clubs). Considering that the vast majority of vessels worldwide are entered into UK-based P&I Clubs, English insurance law has global reach and implications for assureds worldwide. 28 Thus, the discussion below is carried out essentially from the perspective of English law.
No Cover for Loss Arising When Involved in IUU Fishing
The empirical study described above shows that, in practice, the owners of fishing vessels which have had previous involvement in IUU fishing activities have little difficulty in obtaining liability insurance from the market, in particular from P&I Clubs. This is despite the fact that if As indicated earlier, see n. 3 above, it needs to be stressed that not all IUU fishing is necessarily illegal.
Technically speaking, unregulated fishing occurs because (a) there is no RFMO to regulate the stock in the geographical area, or (b) it is a new and unregulated stock, or (c) the stock is fished within the boundaries of an RFMO that has a regulatory focus on other species, or (d) fishing occurs within the boundaries of an RFMO and the vessel implicated is either without nationality or registered in a country not party to the RFMO. A vessel that incurs liability when involved in unregulated fishing activity could, therefore, be able to recover from liability insurers.
However, it is common to see in practice that vessels are often involved not only in unregulated fishing activities, but also fish illegally. That is, they fish in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that The Act came into force on 12 Aug. 2016 and is applicable to all marine insurance contracts entered into on or after this date.
involved in IUU fishing, cover will be suspended during this period. It might be argued that in so far as a loss of liability had no connection with the illegal fishing (for example, a fire in the engine-room), then s11 could apply. This provision allows an assured to claim despite a breach of warranty if the claimant proves that the warranty was aimed at reducing the risk of loss of a particular kind, or a loss occurring at a particular location or time, and that the non-compliance could not have increased the risk of the loss that actually occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred. However, this is unlikely. Section 11 is not applicable to warranties that serve the purpose of delineating the cover as a whole. It is respectfully suggested that this is the case here.
The main function of the warranty of legality under the Marine Insurance Act is to assist the underwriters in the risk assessment process by determining the limits of the cover. In case of its breach, the risk assessment undertaken by the insurer at the outset is in tatters. For that reason, there is no room for the application of s. 11 in this context. A contrary solution would reduce the role this warranty is expected to play, affording an assured a potential lifeline in cases where the insured adventure is performed in an illegal fashion under his control. The authors are strongly of the view that such an outcome would be inconsistent with public policy.
Recovery for Loss Arising When the Vessel Not Involved in IUU Fishing
The prospects of recovery under a liability policy or P&I cover are bleak if a vessel with previous involvement in IUU fishing activities incurs a liability, even when she is not involved in IUU fishing at the time. Assuming that the liability insurance is subject to English law, the assured is expected to disclose all material circumstances relating to the risk when applying for P&I membership or seeking commercial insurance. Under s 7(3) of the Insurance Act 2015, 'a circumstance or representation is material if it would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms'. 38 Naturally, if the vessel in question has previously been involved in IUU fishing activity and detained or fined, one would expect this to be a 'material circumstance' which would have to be disclosed to a Club or commercial insurer at the time of making an application to obtain insurance cover.
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In the case of non-disclosure, the insurer could potentially avoid the policy later when he discovers failure on the part of the assured to make a fair presentation, as long as he demonstrated either that he would not have entered the contract on any terms had he known the true state of affairs, or that the assured had acted deliberately or recklessly. 40 One lifeline for the assured in that case would be to argue there was no obligation on her to disclose the detention or fine on the basis that such facts were presumed to be known by the insurer. Presumed knowledge would be a plausible argument if the detention or fine had been made public in a press release or could be found by a simple search of the relevant databases, which are easily available to insurers. 42 Another plausible argument would be that no duty exists under the Act to disclose matters covered by a warranty. Hence, in the presence of the implied warranty of illegality in the policy, it would be superfluous to disclose the matters concerning IUU fishing in which the vessel was engaged prior to the contract. 43 Although this looks promising at first sight, it is likely that such argument would not succeed because concealing previous fines and/or convictions associated with IUU fishing would in all probability be a material fact that relates to the moral hazard of the assured. 
Cancellation of Cover Following Engagement in IUU Fishing
A P&I Club could cancel the cover if it becomes aware of a vessel being involved in illegal activities, even though at that stage no liability has been incurred. According to the rules of some clubs, such cancellation is automatic if the vessel is involved in an illegal activity. For instance,
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It was deliberated recently in The Nancy (n. 34 above) whether the underwriter in question was deemed to possess information that appears on databases, such as Lloyd's MIU and Sea-web. Blair J was convinced that the fact that the information is available online does not give rise to a presumption of knowledge on the part of underwriters. However, from the judgment it is clear that an underwriter is presumed to hold information that he has access to as long as he has an interest in such information when it is received. 
The Role of Liability Insurance
The legal analysis thus far demonstrates that an assured engaged in IUU fishing activities will find it difficult to enforce its liability cover for a variety of reasons. In the UK, s. 163A(5) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 provides that a ship entering or leaving a port without having a certificate to show that there is insurance cover with regard to liabilities that might arise under the Bunker Convention will be detained by the port authority that has jurisdiction, and the master or the owner shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (£5000).
involved in such practices, manage to secure liability cover with ease --and in most instances without any qualification in cover 47 --affirms the assumption that liability insurers inadvertently contribute to the problem of IUU fishing. This possibly arises due to the fact that the underwriting process of liability insurers lacks thorough risk assessment analysis. Those who are more cynical might even suggest that liability insurers are tempted to offer cover to such vessels on the basis of a superficial risk assessment in the knowledge that they would be able to deny liability under the policy if and when such liability arose.
The authors have no evidence to suggest that liability insurers' risk assessment with regard to fishing vessels is inadequate or slapdash. In fact, most P&I Clubs pride themselves on their commitment to conducting their business based on ethical, legal and transparent standards.
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The real question is therefore how risk assessment process can be amended to flag up problems of IUU fishing. It , for example, focus the minds of assureds seeking cover if a specific question at the proposal stage were put to them concerning fines paid and detentions incurred as a result of IUU fishing activities within the last five years. There is, however, no guarantee that such question would engender the necessary disclosure, especially if the purpose of seeking 47 E.g., it would be very effective if vessels with a history in IUU fishing are offered liability cover with a condition that they must keep their GPS system in operation at all times so as to monitor their whereabouts. Equally, it would be very prudent if such vessels are required by the provisions of the insurance policy to undergo spot checks on a regular basis to prevent IUU catches. list. It is submitted that, if established, an independent body could collect and update this data regularly making it available for the public and insurance sector.
The measures suggested above would certainly assist liability insurers at the underwriting stage to deny coverage to those likely to engage in IUU fishing activities. Alternatively they could qualify the coverage offered so that those planning to engage in IUU fishing could be deterred. However, it is submitted that in order to incentivize liability insurers to engage in a more robust underwriting process, such steps might not be sufficient. The authors opine that legal measures outside insurance law are vital. The following section reviews how the existing legal regime could be amended to achieve this objective. We are aware that, even if such steps are taken, this will not eliminate the possibility that an insured vessel might be involved in IUU fishing activity. However, with the changes proposed, liability insurers will be required to undertake a more robust risk assessment exercise than they currently. This would place them in a position to deny coverage to vessels which are blacklisted for their involvement in IUU fishing, or to impose restrictions when there is sufficient ground to suspect involvement in IUU fishing, which could deter vessels from engaging in such activities in the future.
Finally, it should be stressed that although the analysis above based on principles of prohibition is supplemented by a restriction on granting community funds to these operators.
Here, the objective is to prevent EU nationals from engaging in IUU fishing activities or making commercial gains from such activities.
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To name a few: any engagement in fish processing operations or participation in any transhipment with IUU fishing vessels is prohibited; EU IUU fishing vessels are only permitted to access their home ports, and third country IUU vessels are not permitted to enter Community ports; the importation of fishery products caught by IUU fishing vessels/vessels of NCTCs is prohibited, including the exportation/re-exportation of fishery products from IUU fishing vessels for processing.
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EU IUU Regulation, n. 3 above, Art. 40(2).
The EU IUU Regulation creates the following three offences, or serious infringements, in For the infringements to be subject to the Regulation, they must be committed within the territory of a Member State, including maritime waters under their jurisdiction, by Community fishing vessels or Member State nationals: EU IUU Regulation, n. 3 above, Art. 41(1) and (2). The EU IUU Regulation also provides in Art. 41(3) that it applies to 'serious infringements detected within the territory or within waters as referred [above]…but which have been committed on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a third country and are being sanctioned pursuant to Article 11(4)'.
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EU IUU Regulation, n. 3 above, Art. 42 (1)(a) which refers to Art. 3.
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Ibid., Art. 42(1)(b).
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Ibid., Art. 42(1)(c).
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Ibid., Art. 43(1). The Regulation in Art. 43(1) recommends a number of immediate enforcement measures, such as the immediate cessation of fishing activities, the rerouting of the vessel to the port, the seizure of the fisheries products and the suspension of the authorization to fish.
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EU IUU Regulation, n. 3 above, Art. 44.
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These sanctions include the temporary immobilization of the fishing vessel, the confiscation of prohibited fishing gear, catches or fishery products, the suspension or withdrawal of authorization to fish, the reduction or withdrawal of fishing rights and the temporary or permanent ban on access to public assistance or subsidies. 
Insurance and the EU IUU Regulation
The EU IUU Regulation makes no express reference to insurance. Still, can its provisions be interpreted to prohibit the provision of insurance to IUU vessels and related activities? This is possible, though perhaps not immediately obvious. Firstly, the measures imposed against blacklisted vessels and NCTCs are exhaustively described in Articles 37 and 38 of the EU IUU Regulation. They do not include providing insurance. The reference to 'other services' in Article 37(6) evidently relates to the remainder of the provision which does not permit the supply of these vessels 'with provisions, fuel' in EU ports. This too suggests that insurance is excluded from the scope of Article 37(6).
It might be argued that Article 39(1) of the Regulation ('Nationals subject to the jurisdiction of Member States (…) shall neither support nor engage in IUU fishing, including by engagement on board or as operators or beneficial owners of fishing vessels included in the Community IUU vessel list') should be construed to include a prohibition on providing insurance. Could it be concluded that those who provide insurance for vessels involved in IUU vessels support such activities within the meaning of this article? If this is the accurate construction, Member States have authority to 'take appropriate action, subject to and in accordance with their applicable laws and regulation'. 89 A similar argument could be made to the effect that insuring a blacklisted vessel is an activity which is 'directly connected to IUU fishing' under Article 42(1)(b).
It is submitted that while both arguments are ambitious, the first is plausible under an expansive interpretation of the Regulation. The expression 'support (…) IUU fishing' can more easily be argued to apply to insurance as the word 'support' potentially has a wider meaning than 89 EU IUU Regulation, n. 3 above, Art. 39(3).
'directly connected to'. It certainly covers beneficial owners of blacklisted vessels, as they stand in a direct legal relation to the fishing vessels, and opens up the possibility that the provision could be extended to cover insurers, as well as other financial institutions that lend to or invest in the businesses that partake in IUU fishing. Given that 'support' does not equal 'control', a presumption of control over the activities of the IUU fishers may not be needed for this provision to apply. Therefore, it is certainly plausible that insurers could be treated similar to beneficial owners although they have little, if any, control over the activities of the vessels. The fact that insurance supports the IUU fishing activities indirectly might be sufficient to bring this activity under the scope of the Regulation, even if such inclusion was not contemplated by the drafters of the Regulation.
The expression 'directly connected to IUU fishing' must be interpreted by reference to the overarching philosophy of the Regulation, namely, to regulate the supply chain from the net to the plate. Liability insurance is not 'directly connected to IUU fishing'. It covers the liability exposure of the vessels' owners, providing support to IUU fishing in a remote, indirect manner.
The prohibition in the EU IUU Regulation is reserved for activities that have an immediate impact on IUU fishing. These activities are to be identified by reference to the remainder of The same is true for the IUU Fishing Order. Section 9(7) of the Order mirrors the Regulation by providing that 'it is an offence for a person to conduct business directly connected to IUU fishing, within the meaning of Article 42(1)(b) of the Council Regulation'. There is nothing to suggest that the interpretation of the expression 'directly connected' in the Order should be different to that of the Regulation. The explanatory memorandum to the Order states that one of the aims of the EU IUU Regulation is to widen the scope of enforcement via the fishery supply chain. 96 In that respect, the Order clarifies that this provision captures activities emanating from the supply chain. Having said that, it is possible that the references to 'ancillary operations' and 'ancillary activities' in ss. 12 and 13 respectively can be and are given a broad interpretation to cover insurance.
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Ibid., Recital 39.
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Ibid., Art. 90(1)(a)-(b).
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Explanatory Memorandum to IUU Fishing Order, n. 83 above, In light of this analysis, it is the view of two of the authors of the article that the EU IUU Regulation offers some basis of support for an expansive interpretation of related or ancillary activities that would cover insurance, but the connection between the IUU regulatory regime and insurance is tenuous at best. 97 The Regulation deals with the supply chain, and the clear inclusion of insurance has not been considered.
Reasons for Not Including Insurance Prohibition into the Relevant Legislation
If the provision of insurance is not clearly within the scope of the EU IUU fishing framework, ought this to change?
The EU Commission recently published an evaluation of the application of the EU IUU Regulation. 98 The report focuses on the supply chain, with the Commission commenting that the 'industry now pays increased attention to all components of the supply chain in order to ensure that only legally caught fishery products enter the EU'. 99 Most importantly, the report states that 'the Commission has become aware of a number of practical issues that could be addressed in order to enhance the effectiveness of the IUU Regulation'. 100 However, insurance does not seem to be in the Commission's sights. Instead, the proposed measures expand existing arrangements.
For example, they recommend the creation of an electronic catch certificate scheme, the continuing provision of technical aid to third countries with regard to IUU fishing, and the improvement of international ocean governance.
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The EU's approach towards insurance is not unique. The prevailing tendency among drafters of domestic IUU fishing legislation is to avoid insurance-specific prohibitions. 102 The authors believe that this is a short-sighted approach that fails to address the problem of IUU fishing in a proactive, holistic manner. This trend is not based on an evidence-based decision on the role of insurance in IUU fishing. On the contrary, the evidence examined below suggests that insurance has a major role to play in the fight against IUU fishing.
In that respect, the IPOA-IUU is illuminating. Without such certificates, operational capacity of such vessels would be restricted, with a severe impact on the commercial viability of such operations.
An Insurance-Related Amendment to the EU IUU Regulation
The fact that at least 47.9% of fishing vessels over 1,000 tonnes suspected of being involved in IUU fishing activity have secured liability cover is a serious impediment to the fight against IUU fishing. 108 There is little doubt that the existing supply-related measures have reduced the levels of IUU fishing. Yet, the evidence suggests that the problem is far from eradicated or even controlled, 109 as both the IPOA-IUU and the OECD suggest that cutting the insurance supply will further reduce IUU fishing by impeding the operation of IUU vessels.
The EU is in a privileged position since it has a comprehensive set of IUU fishing regulations. As a result, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The EU IUU Regulation can be amended, subject to the prior consultation requirement of the IPOA-IUU, to explicitly No. 267/2012, which prohibits any 'financial assistance' for the transport of petroleum products of Iranian origin, can be used as a roadmap. 110 As such, a future amendment of the relevant EU IUU Regulation might read as follows:
It shall be prohibited to provide insurance and reinsurance with regard to: i) vessels included in the Community IUU vessel list; ii) fishing vessels flying the flag of countries included in the list of noncooperating third countries; and iii) the importation, exportation, purchase, or transport of fishery products obtained from vessels in paras i) and ii) above.
At the same time, the sanctions provided in the IUU fishing regulation could be amended to reflect the extension of its scope to insurers. This would be an extensive prohibition, as it covers hull and liability insurance (i and ii), as well as cargo insurance (iii). We strongly argue that such a wide provision is essential for the measure to have a positive effect. As a concession, the prohibition would not cover vessels issued with alerts under Articles 23 and 24 of the EU IUU Regulation, unless they have officially been 'named and shamed' via the two blacklists. An expansion to cover such vessels might be part of a further amendment to the Regulation once it is established that the original prohibition has begun to take effect in practice. ii) providing insurers with an unambiguous legal argument to change their underwriting practices and (it is hoped) to take awareness measures along the lines of those proposed in section 3 of this paper.
It is likely that insurers will raise the issue of the costs of adapting to the suggested prohibition.
Yet it is expected that any increase in the cost of doing business for insurers would be minimal as, firstly, the two blacklists of the EU IUU Regulation are publicly available and frequently updated and, secondly, insurers have already developed sophisticated compliance procedures to deal with the wide range of political sanctions that are in force around the world. If insurers are able to establish due diligence procedures to comply with the labyrinth of political sanctions, compliance with the IUU blacklists is unlikely to be found challenging.
Domestic Legislation Post Brexit
On 23 June 2016, the UK population voted to leave the EU, with the decision causing quite a stir on both sides of the English Channel. At the time of writing there is little to suggest whether we will witness a 'hard' departure where neither party would have full access to each other's markets, or a light version based either on the model of the so-called 'fax democracy' usually associated with Norway or the Swiss 'a la carte' model.
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In the case of IUU fishing, it is expected that the (relatively small) British catch fisheries industry will exercise disproportionate political pressure to 'renegotiate quota shares, as well as access arrangements' on a bilateral basis, cognizant of the fact that ʽit is not politically or legally possible just to ring-fence most of our fish resourcesʼ. 112 The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (once enacted) will incorporate the EU IUU fishing regulations into UK law. This development aims to provide legal certainty and stability in the immediate aftermath of Brexit as it ensures that the current EU laws on IUU fishing, including the IUU Fishing Order, will continue to apply uninterrupted. Still, in the long term the British Government will be required to develop a domestic scheme of monitoring, preventing and sanctioning IUU fishing. In that respect, it is expected that Norway will be used as an example of a country that enjoys independence over its fishery policy while being part of the European Economic Area.
This presupposition overlooks that Norway has been a pioneer in the fight against IUU fishing, having established its own blacklist of vessels since 1994. 113 For the UK, following the Norwegian example would reinvent the wheel as it would require, among other things, the drafting of blacklists, the funding of research to ensure the continuing development of measures against IUU fishing, and the conclusion of bilateral agreements with third countries (including the EU) on catch certificates. Creating such a framework is feasible, yet it would require substantial funds and legislative time without strengthening the fight against IUU fishing. The end result will be the creation of yet another regime that will impede the flow of information among the various stakeholders and reduce the effectiveness of the measures. Fragmentation is never the answer to combatting criminal activities, especially when they are perpetrated at an international level; it is not surprising then that the trend is towards the international harmonization of the measures against IUU fishing.
The authors believe that a sensible course of action is to isolate the issue of IUU fishing from the political negotiations over the EU Common Fisheries Policy. It is a technical issue which requires a level of cooperation and information exchange that is unlikely to ensue from the political minefield of the negotiations over border controls. In that respect, it is to be hoped that, despite the unfavourable current political climate, 114 a sui generis solution can be achieved whereby the UK remains an integral part of the EU IUU fishing measures, development and funding.
Our insurance-related recommendation, on the other hand, is not expected to be adversely affected by Brexit, irrespective of the form it may take. Any prohibition to insure IUU vessels can be implemented into English law with minimal disruption. Considering the international clientele of British-based insurers and P&I clubs, we consider that even a strictly domestic prohibition would contribute to the prevention of IUU practices worldwide. At the same time, it would send a strong message to the EU and the rest of the world that insurance should not be overlooked in the war against IUU fishing.
Conclusion
So far, various legal measures have been taken to tackle IUU fishing activities within the EU and worldwide. There is no denying that these measures have yielded positive results. However, this article demonstrates that the war is far from over. It is evident from the empirical study carried out that those involved or suspected to be involved in IUU fishing have no difficulty in obtaining
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See F. Perraudin, 'UK to "Take Back Control" of Waters after Exiting Fishing Convention', The Guardian, 2 July 2017, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/02/uk-take-back-control-londonfisheries-convention-michael-gove. liability insurance which enables them to carry out their activities. We argue that changes in underwriting practices are desirable to ensure that liability insurance coverage is denied to those vessels with a history of IUU fishing activities. However, without the explicit backing of law that will force liability insurers to decline cover to such vessels, it will prove a greater challenge to incentivize insurers to change their current practices. Such a change should be relatively easy to implement even in the context of EU law, which is rather fragmented in the manner it deals with IUU fishing. At the national level, however, it should be relatively easy to implement changes in the relevant legislation to explicitly prohibit insurance providers from offering insurance cover for vessels involved in IUU fishing on a regular basis. Even in the case of the UK leaving the EU, such measures could be taken unilaterally.
The concluding message of this article is clear: in order to combat IUU fishing, a holistic approach is needed. Explicitly prohibiting insurance companies from providing liability cover to those involved in IUU fishing activities on a regular basis can, and should be, incorporated into this approach. This would not eliminate IUU fishing altogether as it is possible that fishing vessels with no previous record of IUU fishing might be opportunistically involved in such activities after obtaining liability insurance cover. However, improved clarity in interpretations and changes in relevant legislation will certainly make it more difficult for regular offenders to obtain liability cover with ease and no qualification, and thus put a restriction on their ability to operate.
